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FROM LABOUR'S PAIN COMES LABOR'S
GAIN? THE HIGH COURT'S DECISION IN
THE WORK CHOICES CASE AND
THE COMMONWEALTH'S
CORPORATIONS POWER
OSCAR Roos*
The author contends that the High Court's emphatic joint maJonty
decision in the Work Choices Case in 2006 exemplifies well established
principles of constitutional interpretation in consu'uing the heads of
Commonwealth legislative power. However, in assessing the likely
political ramifications of the decision, the author takes a broader
historical perspective. He concludes that the majority judgment's
unambiguous confrrmation of the plenary scope of the Commonwealth's
corporations power under the Constitution provides unbounded
opportunities for a future federal Labor Government in Australia, in
curbing and controlling the massive influence of 'The Corporation' in a
globalised world.
John Roward offers a form of market fundamentalism ... [b]y contrast,
social democrats offer a different n3.ITative for our country's long term
future ...Social democrats believe in the market. But we don't believe in
market fundamentalism. We don't believe in an unconstrained market.
Current Federal Labor Leader & Leader of the Opposition, Kevin Rudd
MP, 'Child of Hayek', The Australian (Sydney), 20th December 2006,
12.
I INTRODUCTION
The decision of the High Court in November 2006 concerning the
constitutionality of the Howard Government's Workplace Relations
Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) (Work Choices Act),l
,
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* Oscar Roos, Lecturer, School of Law, Faculty of Business and Law, Deakin
University. The author would like to thank Dr John Morss, Associate Head of School
(Research), School of Law, Faculty of Business and Law, Deakin University for his
assistance in writing this article and the anonymous reviewer for their helpful
comments. Responsibility for any errors lies entirely with the author.
New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR I. At the time of publication of
this paper, the decision has not yet been reported in the official series. the
Commonwealth Law Reports. Its medium-neutral citation is [20061 HCA 52 (14
November 2006).
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was one of the more politically charged (and politkally significant)
High Court constitutional cases since Federation. The challenge to
the legislation by five Labor controlled States and two large unions
(collectively 'the plaintiffs'2) captured public attention in a way
unseen for a constitutional case since the 'Tasmanian Dam'
litigation in the early 1980s.3 The plaintiffs' challenge failed. On 14
November 2006 the High Court decisively determined, in New South
Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR 1 ('the Work Choices
Case'),4 that the entirety of the Work Choices Act was
constitutionally valid.
The plaintiffs' defeat had been widely forecasted by academic
commentators, although perhaps not the upholding of the validity of
the Work Choices Act in its entirety.5 In many quarters, the High
2
J
4
5
That is, the States of New South Wales, Western Australia, South Australia,
Queensland and Victoria, and Unions NSW and the Australian Workers' Union. The
Labor Govcrnments of Tasmania, the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital
Territory also all intervened in support of the plaintiffs' challenge: see New Sourh
Wales l' Commonwealrh (2006) 231 ALR 1. 7 {6] (Gleeson CJ. Gummow, Hayne,
Heydon and Crennan J1).
The Tasmanian Dam litigation concerned the Commonweahh Government's allempts
to stop the Tasmanian Government bUilding a large hydro electric dam on the Gordon
river below its intersection with the Franklin liver, thereby flooding the FrankJin River
valley. a pristine wilderness area. The Commonwealth's attempts were succcssful: see
Commonwealth v Tasmallia (1983) 158 CLR 1 (,Tasmanian Dam Case'). The
Commonwealth's a.etions in stopping the building of the dam were in fulfilment of
election promises made during the 1983 Federal election campaign in which the
building of the dam was one of the key election issues.
By a clear majority of five (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Haync, Heydon and Crennan JJ)
writing a joint majority judgment: sec New Sourh Wales v CommO/lwealth (2006) 23\
ALR I. I-Ill [1]-f422J. The dissentients were Kirby J (at 111·65 [423]-[616]) and
Callinan j (at 165-276 [617]-f9J41J.
Sce. eg. DaITcll Barnett, 'The Corporations Power and Federalism: Key Aspects of tbe
Constitutional Validity of the Workchoices Acr' (2006) 29(1) Universiry o/New South
Wales Lalt' Journal 91; Anthony Gray, 'Precedent and Policy: Australian Industrial
Relations Reform in the 21~ Century using the Corporations Power' (2005) 10(2)
Deakirl Law Review 440; Ron McCallum, 'The Australian Constitution and the
Shaping of our Federal and State Labour Laws' (2005) 10(2) Deakin Law Review 460,
467: Gonz.alo Puig. 'Constitutionality of Workchoices' (2006) 44(1) Law SocieTy
Journal 64; Andrew Stewart. 'Federal Labour Law and New Uses for the Corporations
Power' (2001) 14 Australian JOllrnal of Labour Lalt' I. 12-13: Bill Ford. 'The
Corpor<ltisation of Australian Labour Law: Completing Howard's Unfinished
Business' (2006) 19 Australian Journal a/Labour taw 144, 145, 155; John Williams,
'The Constitution and the Workplace Relations Act 1996' (2006) 16(2) The ECOIlllntics
and Labour Relations Review 62. Aspects of the legislation upon which some
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Court's decision was received as a stunning victory for both the
Howard Government and the forces supporting industrial 'reform',6
who had long had the 'industrial relations club'] in their sights.
Notwithstanding the Labor States' and unions' immediate loss (and
the Commonwealth Coalition Government's win) however, the
decision of the High Court in the Work Choices Case provides
enormous opportunities for the legislative implementation of agenda
more closely associated with the Australian Labor Party and the
broader left movement, in ways that would have been unimaginable
for the federal Labor administrations which governed Australia
intermittently in the 20 th century.s In a nutshell, the mammoth scope
of the corporations power, now decisively confirmed by the majority
6
7
8
commentators expressed doubt as to constitutional validity included the provIsions
relating to the regulation of unions: see, eg, Stewal1 at 19; the broad regulation making
power, and those laws dealing with the exclusion of State industrial laws re
corporations presently regulated within the States' industrial relations systems: see, eg,
Ford at 160.
Indeed, the successful use by the Commonwealth of the corporations power to regulate
indusl.l;al relations generally was foreshadowed by legal commentators decades earlier:
see, eg, David Solomon, The Political Impact of the High Cmlrt (1992) 119; J
O'Donovan, 'Can the Contract of Employment be Regulated Through the Corporations
Power?' (1977) 51 Australian Law Joumal 234; cf Andrew Stewart and George
Williams, Work Choices: What the High Court Said (2007) 35, 152-3. See also New
South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR I, 17 [46] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow,
Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ); Actors and Announcers Equity Association I' Fontana
Films Ply Lld (1982) 150 CLR 169,212 (Murphy J).
See, eg, the editorial of the right of centre national broadsheet newspaper The
Australian on )5 November 2006 (the day after the High Court's decision was handed
down) headed 'High Court Ruling a Reform Positive' (Editorial, 'High Court Ruling a
Reform Positive', The Australian (Sydney), )5 November 2006, 17). For a brief but
critical examination of the use of the word 'refonD' in the context of changes to labour
and employment laws, see Brian Brooks, 'The Reform of Labour Laws: An
Inlemational Comparison' (2006) 29(1) Universiry of New South Wales Law Journal
22,22,25.
For a discussion of the coining and use of the pejorative term 'industrial relations club'
to describe the perceived co y alliance between the Industrial Relations Commission
(and its predecessor, the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission) and peak employer
and trade union groups under the long established system of compulsory arbitration
and conciliation, see Braham Dabscheck, Australian Inelustrial Relations in the 1980s
(1989) 124-6.
See, eg, Michael Crommelin and Gareth Evans. 'Explorations and Adventures with
Commonwealth Power.' in G. Evans (ed), Labor and the Constitution 1972-1975
(1977) 24, '25-37 for a discussion of the constitutional travails experienced by the
Whitlam Govemment in attempting to regulate aspects of the national economy.
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11 THE RELEVANCE OF THE CORPORATIONS POWER TO THE
WORK CHOICES ACT
The Work Choices Act makes extensive amendments to the
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ('the Amended Act'). While the
Amended Act relies disparately on a number of different heads of
power with respect to the constitutional validity of its provisions,10 it
Southern Cross University Law Review
The remaining limitations include (i) that the 'corporations power' in pi 51 (xx) is
limited to 'trading alld financial corporations' (cf corporations simpliciter or all
corporations): see Stewart & Williarns, above n 5. 156; (ii) that to fall within the
corporations power, Federal laws must be 'with respect to' constitutional corporations,
ie there must be a 'sufficiency of connexion' between the Federal law and
constitutional corporations: see, eg, Re Dingjan; Ex parte Wagner (2000) 203 CLR
323; (iii) that any Federal law cannot impair the institutional integrity of State
governments (also known as the Melbourne Corporation principle); and (iv) that,
consistent with tIle principle articulated in Attorney-General (Cth) v Schmidr (1961)
105 CLR 361 ('Schmidr'), any law passed by reference to the corporations power must
not be subject to an express limitation elsewhere in s 51, such a the prOhibition on
Commonwealth regulation of state banking in s 51(xiii). Limitations (iii) and (iv) are
discussed later in this paper.
10 There are of course other constitutional heads of Commonwealth legislative power
relied upon to validate certain provisions in the Amended Act: ee, eg, s 6(1 )(d) (the
interstate and international trade and commerce power) (CoJ1stitwion s 51 (i); s 6(1 )(e),
(f) of the Amended Act (the territories power) (ConstiTution s 122); s 3(n) of the
9
- 84-
in the Work Choices Case, provides virtually unlimited opportunities
for the Commonwealth Government directly to regulate the
activities of most corporations,9 and by virtue of the corporation's
ubiquitous presence in the 2pt century economy, to regulate the
economy itself.
This paper focuses primarily upon the five justice joint majority
judgment in the Work Choices Case. It explains why the
corporations power is central to the majority's determination and
how the majority applies basic principles of constitutional
characterisation to arrive at its conclusion about the scope of the
corporations power. The paper also assesses, in the light of the
majority judgment, the continuing relevance of federalism to the
characterisation of Commonwealth legislative power. Finally, it
attempts to place the corporations power aspect of the majority's
decision in the Work Choices Case in a broader political context.
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11
is the use of the corporations power which gives it its massive
coverage over Australian workplaces, II and grounds its aspiration to
establish and maintain a 'national system of workplace relations' .12
The scope and construction of the corporations power is therefore
the 'principle issue' 13 as to the legislation's constitutional validity.
The 'linchpin' 14 connecting the Amended Act to the Constitution is
found in ss 5 and 6 of the Amended Act. These sections contain the
definitions of 'employee' and 'employer' respectively. An
'employee' is relevantly defined in sub-s 5(1) of the Amended Act
as being an employee of an 'employer' as defined in sub-s 6(1); an
'employer' is in turn defined in paragraph (a) of sub-s 6(1) as
including any 'constitutional corporation'; a 'constitutional corpor-
ation' is in turn defined in s 4 of the Amended Act as meaning 'a
corporation to which paragraph 51(xx) of the Constitution
applies' .15
Amended Act (the external affairs power) (Constitution 51 (xxix»; sch 6 of the
Amended Act (the industrial relations power) (Constitution s 51 (xxxv»; pt 21 of the
Amended Act which operates on employees and employers in the State of Victolia
pursuant to a referral of power under the Commonwealth Powers (Industrial Relations)
Act 1996 (Vie) (Constitution s 51 (xxxvii».
See New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR I, 16-7, (45) (G1eeson CJ,
Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). Although, of course, the corporations
power only relates to 'trading and financial corporations', (howsoever defined): see
above n 9. Some conunentators estimate that this could exclude up to a quarter of the
Australian workforce: see Stewart & Williams, above n 5, 156; re the most populous
state of New South Wales, one estimate is that approximately 75 per cent of employees
in that state will be covered: see L Roth, The New Federal WOI:kplace Relations
System, Briefing Paper No 2/06, Parliamentary Research Service, Sydney, New South
Wales.
12 The Amended Act s 3(b) (emphasis added).
13 New South Wales \I Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR 1, 16 (Gleeson Cl, Gummow,
Hayne, Heydon and Crennan J1).
14 Ell Murray, 'Work Choices and the Radical Revision of the Public Realm of the
Australian Statutory Labour Law', (2006) 35(4) Industi"ial Law Journal 343, 351 .
15 The phra e 'constitutional corporation' is legjslative shorthand for 'trading or fmancial
corporations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth' or 'foreign corporations'
as derived fTom s 51 (xx) of the Constitution. The use of an express reference to 5
51 (xx) of the ConstiTUrion in drafting Commonwealth legislation which regulates
corporations, in order to utilise the full scope of the head of power appears to date at
least from the World Heritage Prope/1ies Conservation Act 1983 (Cth) s 10(1), which
was the subject of the Tasmanian Dam litigation. The use of the precise phrase
'constitutjonal corporation' in a statutory definition in like terms to that which appears
. I
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The use of the compendious phrase 'constitutional corporation' in
the Amended Act means there was no issue, in the Work Choices
litigation, as to the types of corporations that the Commonwealth,
pursuant to the Amended Act, was constitutionally permitted to
regulate. 16 The definition in the Amended Act is fully coextensive
with the corporations power itself.!? The issue therefore in the Work
Choices litigation was whether the impugned legislation could be
characterised as being 'with respect to'18 the corporations power. 19
III THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE AND THE CORPORATIONS POWER
The case for the plaintiffs against the constitutionaJ validity of the
Act, in so far as its validity rested on the corporations power, could
be distilled to three arguments: 20
1. The corporations power as expressed in s 51(xx) of the
Constitution should be read down such that it only confers
power on the Commonwealth legislature to pass legislation
regulating corporations in their external relations, as opposed to
their internal relations, and that a corporation's relationship with
its employees should be characterised as an internal relation of
the corporation.
2. Partly following on from (1) above, the relevant test as to
whether an impugned law was 'with respect to' the specific head
of power contained in s 51(xx) was that there had to be a
positive connexion between the corporation qua corporation and
in s 6 of the Amended Act fir~l appears in s 156 of the Industrial RelatiOTlS Act 1988
(Cth), the subject of litigation in ViCloria I' Commonweallh (1996) 187 CLR 416 and
reappears in.s 127C(2) of the IndllSlrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth). the subject of
litigntioll in Re Dil1gjan: Ex parte Wagner (2000) 203 CLR 323. See also Ford. above
n 5,147.
16 Nel\" SOli/I! Wales \' Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR 1,919], 20 [551 (Gleeson CJ.
Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan 11).
17 lbid 56 [1851 (Gleeson Cl, Gummow, Haync, Heydon and Crennan Jl); see also 128-9
f474j (Kirby 1).
(Glceson CJ,
18 Sce AI/Slta/ion Constitution s 51
19 New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR I, 56 [ IS4l
Gummow. Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). 128-9 f474] (Kirby Jl·
20 lbid 21 [57] (Glce.<;on CJ. Gummow. Haync. Heydon and Crennan JJ).
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the nature or character of the impugned law, such that 'the
nature of the corporation is significant as an element in the
nature or character of the laws'.This test was labelled the
'distinctive character test' . 22
3. The corporations power in s 5l(xx) should be read down by
reference to s 5l(xxxv), the constitutional head of power with
respect to the prevention and settlement of interstate industrial
disputes by way of conciliation and arbitration. In other words
the power of the Commonwealth Parliament to make laws with
respect to industrial relations generally was restricted
substantially by the express terms of s 51(xxxv).
There was an additional concern underlying all three of the above
arguments, namely that th re must be some restraint on 'the stirring
giant'23 of the corporations power in order to restrain Common-
wealth legislative power and preserve the federal balance.24
22 See Actors and Annoullcers Equity Association of Australia v Fontana Films Pty Lld
(1982) 150 CLR 169, 182 (Gibbs CJ), 194 (Stephen J), 122 (Brennan J); Tasmanian
Dam Case (1983) \58 CLR 1,240 (Brennan J), 316 (Dawson J); Re Dingjan; Ex parte
Wagner (2000) 203 CLR 323, 345-6 (Dawson 1), 336 (Brennan J), 368-70 (McHugh
J), cf 334 (Mason CJ), 352-3 (Toohey J).
23 Greg Craven, 'Industrial Relations, the Constitution and Federalism: Facing the
Avalanche' (2006) 29(1) University ofNew South Wales Law Jouma/203, 204.
24 New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 23] ALR 1,20 [541,56 [1831 (Gleeson CJ,
Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan 11).
I " ~
.f;
I'
.' ,~
i
!
Volume I 1 - 2007 - 87 -
Copyrfgllt of Full Tel<\. rests with the original owner and, e-eept as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, copying this copyr ght malerialls prohibited without the permission of the owner or
agent or by way of a licence from Copyright Agency Umlted. For Information about such licences, contact the Copyright Agency Um led on (02) 93947600 (ph) or (02) 93947601 (fax)
Oscar Roos
B Why the Majority Rejected the Plaintiffs' First Argument
The majority emphatically rejected the first argument of the
plaintiffs that s 51(xx) only conferred a power to regulate the
external relations of corporations rather than their internal relations.
It maintained that the distinction between the external and internal
relations of corporations was rooted in jurisprudence concerning
choice of law:28 as an aspect of the comity between nations, each
jurisdiction accepted that foreign corporations would be internally
Southern Cross University Law Review
IV WHY THE MAJORITY REJECTED THE PLAINTIFFS' CASE AND
UPHELD THE VALIDITY OF THE WORK CHOICES ACT
A General Comments
The High Court upheld the validity of the Work Choices Act in toto,
notwithstanding that 'the principal object' of the Work Choices Act, .
as expressly stated in its objects clause, was 'to provide a framework
for cooperative workplace relations'25 by, inter alia, 'establishing
and maintaining a simplified national system of workplace
relations' ,26 The majority's decision upholding the validity of the
legislation exemplifies the High COUlt's 'non-purposive' approach
to characterisation, 'that the purpose behind a law is irrelevant to its
characterisation' .27 Indeed, as will be the subject of further
exposition in this paper, the majority in the Work Choices Case
followed an impeccably orthodox approach to constitutional
characterisation throughout.
- 88-
25 The Amended Act S 3.
26 The Amended Act s 3(b). Of course whether the changes introduced by the Work
Choices Act actually simplify work place regulation is a moot point see, eg, Andrew
Stewal1, 'A Simple Plan for Reform? The Problem of Complexity of Workplace
Regulation' (2005) 31 (3) Australian Bulle/in of Labour 210.
27 Craven, above n 23, 208; see al 0 Ford, above n 5; 150; Tony Blackshie1d and George
Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory (4'h ed, 2006) 785-7; Peter Hanks,
Patrick Keyser and lennifer Clarke, Australian Constitutional Law (7'" ed, 2004) 43-5;
B M Selway, 'Methodologies of constitutional interpretation in the High Court of
Australia' (200~) J4 Public Law Review 234; Leslie Zines, 'Characterisation of
Commonwealth Laws' in H P Lee and G Winterton (eds), Australian Constinllional
Perspectives (1992) 33.
28 New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR I, 32 [9J1 (Gleeson Cl,
Gummow, Hayne Heydon and Crennan 11).
~ '.
! ,
i' :
~i
} .~
,"
ri
i..~
k'~
f;
t.. ~
"
,':,.1
~'i~'
'.!'
..
",
r~
t~:i
;~ '.
~:~.i
~ .
f" •r,:,
c;:
,.
~>:~ "
~.~~
~; .
t,
~.I.
~i:>:,
i'.
C
l~·~·
r"~
~'"~,
t,
f
~
~
t·;
~.
~.
~.
~.
~;"
r..
v·
r:
~.
tl:,
~~,
;) ~..
".
Copyrfgllt of Full le"'- rests with the original owner and. e-eept as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968. copying this copyr ght materialls prohibited without the permission of the owner or
agent or by way of a licence from Copyright Agency Umlted. For Information about such licences. contact the Copyright Agency Um ted on (02) 93947600 (ph) or (02) 93947601 (fax)
C Why the Majority Rejected the Plaintiffs' Second Argument
1 General Comments
if-
r;:' From Labour's Pain comes Labor's Gain? The High Court's Decision in the Work
Choices Case and the Commonwealth's Corporations Power
- 89-Volume 11 - 2007
29 Ibid 33-4 (94]-[95J (Gleeson Cl, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan 11).
30 Ibid 32 [901 (Gleeson Cl, Gununow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ).
31 Ibid 31-2 [88J-(90] (Gleeson Cl, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). In fact
the majOlity favoured the view that a corporation's relationships with its employees be
treated as a matter external to the corporation: see ibid 24 [66J. For a further critical
discussion of the' internal/external distinction', see Ford, above n 5, 156.
32 Craven, above n 23, 208.
33
34
(1920)28CLR 129,
See Ne ..... Sollfh Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR I, 34 f951 (Gleeson Cl,
Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan 11).
35 lbid 49 [156] (Gleeson Cl, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ).
36 Ibid 2\ [571 (Gleeson Cl, Gummow. Hayne, Heydon and Crennan J1).
The plaintiffs' second argument grew from the proposition that for
an impugned law to be sufficiently connected with the corporations
power, the law must do more than have corporations as its 'object of
command'.35 The plaintiffs' formulation of a superadded 'distinctive
character test'36 was an attempt to give substance to that putative
regulated by the laws of their country of origin, and that they would
only regulate external activities of a foreign corporation within their
own jurisdiction. It was therefore not helpful in interpreting the
scope of a constitutional head of power within a federal nation.29
Moreover, the distinction suffered from 'inherent instability' ,30 as
illustrated by the uncertainty as to whether a corporation's
relationship with its employees, either CUlTent or prospective, could
properly be characterised as an external or internal relationship of
the corporation.31
Finally, consistent with the 'ultra-literalism'32 of Amalgamated
Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship (' Engineers'),33 the
majority determined that the plaintiffs' advocacy of a notion of
internality and externality in construing the text of the corporations
power was an attempt to place a superfluous, illegitimate and
obscuring gloss upon that power. Simply put, there was no mention
of externality or internality in the text of paragraph 51(xx).34
'I
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extra factor required to bring a Jaw within s 51(xx). The majority
rejected the test as an improper 'piecemeal or sequential approach to
characterisation of a law' .37 Most importantly, in rejecting the test,
the majority unequivocally endorsed an extremely broad, 'pJenary'38
construction of the corporations powcr.39
2 The Majority's Construction of the Corporations Power in the
Work Choices Case
The majority in the Work Choices Case adopts the understanding of
the corporations power developed by Gaudron J in her Honour's
dissenting judgments in Re Dingjan; Ex parte Wagner ('Dingjan')40
and Re Pacific Coal; Ex parte Construction, Forestry, Mining and
Energy Union41 .42
In Dingjan Gaudron J had stated:
[T]he power conferred by section 5l(xx) extends, at the very least,
to the business functions and activities of constitutional
corporations and their business relationships. And those functions,
activities and relationships will, in the ordinary course, involve
individuals, and not merely individuals through whom tbe
corporation acts ... or the control of whose conduct is directly
connected with the regulation or protection of the corporation.
Once it is accepted that s 51 (xx) extends to the business functions,
activities and relationships of constitutional corporations, ir follows
that it also extends to the persons by and rhrough whom they carry
37 Ibid 49 [1551 (Gleeson CJ. Gummow. Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ).
38 Actors and AnlloullcerS Equity Association of Australia I' FOllrana Films Pry Ltd
(1982) 150 CLR 169.208 (Mason J) ('The [corporationsl power should therefore...be
l,:onstrued as a plenary power with re.~pect to the suhjects mentioned free from the
unexpressed qualifications which have been suggested').
39 For a discussion of the 'broad' and 'narrow' views of the corporations power, sce
George WilIiams, 'The Constitution and a National Industrial Relations Regime'
(2005) 10 Deukin Law Rel'l·e.". 498. 504. See also Stewart, above 11 5, 10-11; Ford.
above n 5.149-51.
40 (1995) 183 CLR 323.
41 (2000) 203 CLR 346.
42 Ne.... SOlllh Wales I' Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR l. 54 [1771-[1781 (Gleeson CJ,
Gummuw. Hayne. Heydon and Crennan JJ).
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out those functions and activities and with whom they enter into
those relationships.43
Her Honour clearly and expressly 'extends' the power conferred by
s 51(xx) to the 'persons' 'through whom' the corporation carries out
its business functions. The inclusion of the corporation's employees
(and the industrial relations of the corporation generally) within the
scope of the corporation's power is then made explicit in Her
Honour's judgment in 2000 in Re Pacific Coal; Ex parte
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union,44 in what the
majority in the Work Choices Case describe, in its endorsement of it,
as Gaudron 1's 'amplified'45 understanding of the scope of the
corporations power:46
I have no doubt that the power conferred by s 51(xx) of the
Constitution extends to the regulation of the activities, functions,
relationships and the business of a corporation described in that
subsection, the creation of rights and privileges belonging to such
a corporation, the imposition ofobligations on it and, in respect of
those matters, to the regulation of the conduct of those through
whom it acts, its employees and shareholders and, also, the
regulation of those whose conduct is or is capable of affecting its
activities, junctions, relationships or business... I have no doubt
that it extends to laws prescribing the industrial rights and
obligations of corporations and their employees and the means by
which they are to conduct their industrial relations.47
43 Re Dingjan; Ex parte Wagner (2000) 203 CLR 346, 365. See also 333-4 (Mason J),
342 (Deane J), cf 352-3 (Toohey J), 364-6 (McHugh J) (references omitted &
emphasis added).
44 (2000) 203 CLR 346.
45 New South Wales \' Commollwealth (2006) 231 ALR I. 54 r1781 (Gleeson Cl,
Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ).
46 (2000) 203 CLR 346.
47 Re Pacific Coal; Ex parte COllstruc/iOIl. Forestry. Mining and Energy Union (2000)
203 CLR 346,375 [831 (emphasis added).
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3 The Application of the Majority's Construction of the
Corporations Power to the Work Choices Act
Tuming then to the CnJX of the issue in the Work Choices Case, as
long as the impugned legislation specifically48 singles out
constitutional corporations as the person upon whom it casts
obligations,49 or specifically50 singles out constitutional corporations
in changing, regulating or abolishing tbe corporation's 'duties,
powers and privileges' (t6 adopt the famous passage from Kitto 1's
judgment in FailJax v Federal Commissioner ojTaxation),51 it falls
within the ambit of the corporations power.52 Pursuant to the
definition of 'employer' and 'employee' contained in ss 5 and 6 of
the Amended Act, a constitutional corporation - as an employer - is
necessarily one party to the (contractual) employment relationship.
Therefore, a Commonwealth law which regulates a corporation's
'workplace relations' ,53 which necessarily and specifically includes
a corporation as a party as employer, is ipso facto within the
corporations power,54
48 New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR 1. 49 [J55]-fI561 (G1ceson Cl,
Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan 11).
49 Ibid 46 r144} (Glceson CJ, GumTllow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ).
50 lbid 49 [l551-[156} (Gleeson Cl, Gummow, Hayne, J-leydon and Crennan JJ).
51 (1965) 114 CLR 1,7: (' ... the question of conslitutionaI validity under section 51..
is .. to be determined by reference solely to the operation the enactment has if it be
valid, that is 1.0 say by reference to the nalure of the rights, duties, powers and
privileges which it changes, regulates or abolishes-) (emphasis added). See also New
Somh Wales \' Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR 1, 4S fl42J (Gleeson Cl. Gummow,
Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). ef 128-9 [473H474J (Kirby J),
52 New South Wales v Commonweafrh (2006) 231 ALR 1,76 f266] (Glecson CJ,
Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). For a further summary of the relationship
between the corporations power and the Work Choices Act, see Shae McCrystal,
'Smothering the Right to Strike: Work Choices and Industrial Action' (2006) 19
Australian Journal ofLabour Law 198. 20 I.
53 A usage which seems to have replaced 'industrial relations' (see, eg, the title of the
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) and also s 3). presumably because of the growth
of the service sector of the economy and the reduction in employment in traditional
'industry'.
54 Sce, eg, New South Wafes \' Commonwealrh (2006) 231 ALR I. 74-5 [257]-[258]
(Glecson CJ, GUTllmow. Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). Sce also Bamett, above n 5,
102.
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Thus, the majority works its methodical way through a checklist of
the challenged provisions of the Amended Act with relentless logic.
Unaffected by feelings of sentiment for 'all those hard-fought
decisions of [the High] Court and the earnest presentation of cases,
the advocacy and the judicial analysis and elaboration within them
conceming the ambit of s 51(xxxv)' 55,56 and decrying the fusty
historical treasure hunt for the founding fathers' intention as 'the
pursuit of a mirage' ,57 the majority find each and every impugned
provision of the legislation valid.58
To take but one example: s 755(1)(a)(i) of the Amended Act
regulates the right to enter premises under a prescribed State or
Territory 'OHS law'59 where the premises are 'occupied or
otherwise controlled by a constitutional corporation'. It is valid,
according to the majority, as sufficiently connected with s 51(xx),
as:
[The] question is the regulation of a right of entry to premises, and
the premises to which the right of entry is controlled are premises
'occupied or otherwise controlled by' a constitutional corporation.
This is a sufficient connection with s 51(xx), whether or not the
entry that is thus regulated concerns a business being conducted on
the premises by that corporation. The connection lies in the
controlling of entry to a constitutional corporation's premises. The
law col1trolling entry is a law with respeCT to constitutional
corporations.60
55 New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR I, 114 [434], J J5 [476] (Kirby J).
56 And for several relevant failed referenda: see ibid 41-4 [125]-[ 135} (Gleeson Cl.
Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ), cf -liS [437J, 126-7 [468] (Kirby l), 196-
208 [707]-[735J (Callinan 1).
57 Ibid 39-40 [118]-[120); see also 40-1 [121 H 123) (Gleeson Cl, Gummow, Hayne,
Heydon and Crennun JJ), cf 187 [683]-[684}, 223-4 [772], 236 [802] (Callinan J);
Jeffrey Goldsworthy, 'Original ism in Constitutional Interpretation' (1997) 25 Federal
Law Review I. For a detailed sunmlury of the history of the drafting of the corporations
power, see lohn Williams, above n 5, 3-5.
58 See, eg, New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR J, 62-3 f208J (Gleeson
Cl. Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ)_
59 The Amended Act s 737.
60 New South Wales \' Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR 1. 80 [284) (Gleeson Cl,
Gummow, Hayne Heydon and Crennan 11) (emphasis added). See also the discussion
of the constitutional validity of pt 9 of the Amended Act: New South Wales v
i
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Volume 11 - 2007 - 93 -
:I
I i Copyright of Full TelCt rests with the orlg nal owner and, e)Ccept as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, copying th s copyright materia lis prohibited without the permission of the owner or
agent Or by way or a licence from Copyright Agency Umlt.ed. For Inrorma on about such licences. contact the Copyright Agency Umlted on (02) 93947600 (ph) or (02) 93947601 (rax)
Oscar Roos
The Part is concerned with protecting the integrity of the
employment relationship, or potential employment relationship,
between constitutional corporations and natural persons, from
particularly union 'interference'. That the 'real' purpose of the Part
may be to exclude, or at least significantly reduce the power and
significance of, unions is not to the point. What is important is that
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There is an additional basis upon which impugned provisions of the
Amended Act which regulate either a constitutional corporation's
employees or third patties (ie a party who is not either (i) a
constitutional corporation as employer, or (ii) one of its employees)
can fall within the scope of the corporations power. Pursuant to the
High Court's reasoning in Actors and Announcers Equity
Association of Australia v Fontana Films ('Fontana Films') the
ambit of the corporations power encompasses the regulation of non
corporations where those regulations protect the corporation from
the likelihood of harm.61 Thus, for example, s 496(2) of the
Amended Act, which permits the Australian Industrial Relations
Commission to prevent industrial action by 'non federal system
employees' or 'non federal system employers' (ie employers or
employees who fall outside of the definitions contained in ss 5 and 6
of the Amended Act)62 - where that industrial action may cause
substantial damage or loss 'to the business of a constitutional
corporation' - also falls within the scope of the corporations power,
as being a law 'with respect to' constitutional corporations.63 As put
by Barnett with reference to the freedom of association provisions in
PaIt 16 of the Amended Act:
Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR I, 73-6 [253J-[262J, and the discussion of the
constitutional it)' of sch I of the Amended Act re the regulation of the 'registered'
organisations: ibid 85-8 [309J-[327].
61 In Actors and Announcers Equiry Association of Australia v Fontana Films Pty Lld
(1982) 150 CLR 169 the High Court largely upheld the validity of secondary boycott
provision in the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) which prohibited any person
(including non corporations) from engaging in celtain prosclibed conduct which
inflicted hann upon constitutional corporations: see the discussion of FOlllana Films in
New South Wales jI Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR 1, 49-51 [157J-[ 165J (GJeeson
Cl, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). See also the discussion of Folltana
Films in Bamett, above n 5, 106-7.
62 The Amended Act s 496(3)(a), (b).
63 New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR 1,60 fl981, 75 [258] (Gleeson
Cl, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ).
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64 Bamett, n 5 above, 109 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted).
65 See Ford, n 5 above, 145-6.
66 See, eg, Actors and Announcers Equity Association of Australia v FOIlTana Films Pty
Ltd (1982) 150 CLR 169, 191-2 (Stephen 1). See also New South Wales l'
Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR L 45-6 [1421, 66 [240"1 (Gleeson Cl, Gummow,
Hayne, Heydon and Crennan J1); Bourke l' Stare Bank oINew Sowh Wales (1990) 170
CLR 276, 285; Hanks et ai, above n 27, 41-3; Blackshield & Williams, above n 27.
787-94. For a discussion of this point, see Ford, above n 5. 146.
the conduct to which Part 16 applies is conduct that directly relates
to the employment relationship between constitutional
corporations and its. actual or prospective employees and
contractors. If the Commonwealth has power to regulate the tenns
and conditions of that relationship, it also will have the power to
protect the integrity of that relationship by, for example,
prescribing the persons who mayor may not be involved in, or
'interfere' with, various stages of that relationship.64
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o Why the Majority Rejected the Plaintiffs' Third Argument-
The Relationship between the Corporations Power and
Section 51 (xxxv)
The fact that the Work Choices Act could broadly and' accurately be
described as legislation on the subject matter of industrial or
workplace relations, which, nevertheless, largely falls outside the
scope of s 51(xx.xv) - as not being a law 'with respect to' the
conciliation or arbitration of interstate industrial disputes - did not in
any way inhibit the legislation's characterisation by the majority as
being 'with respect to' the corporations power.
It has long been an accepted canon of constitutional construction
that a law may be characterised as being with respect to more than
one head of power.65 Similarly a law may be characterised as being
with respect to one head of power, even if it is also characterisable
as outside of the scope of another head of power.66 Moreover,
according to the majority, s 51(xxxv) was not a vaguely defined
'industrial relations power', but rather a specific head of power with
respect to a constitutionally prescribed method of resolving
interstate industrial disputes. The misconstruction of s 51(xxxv) as a
Copyrfgllt of Full Tel<t rests with the original owner and, e-eept as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, copying this copyr ght materjalls prohibited without the permission of the owner or
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generalised industrial relations power 'compounds the error'67
inherent in the plaintiffs' argument that S 51(x.x..xv) operates to
delimit the corporations power:
[T]he text of s 51(xxxv}.. .is concerned with a narrower subject~
matter than industrial matters or relations and their regulation.
Legislation may prescribe, independently of any mechanism for
the resolution of disputes, a wide range of matters which may
fairly be regarded as affecting the mutual relations of employers
and empJoyees... Why should the heads of power, particularly s
5l(xx}, which are relied upon by the Commonwealtb ...be
construed as not doing so for the reason that s 51(xxxv) identifies
particular means for the prevention and settlement of certain
industrial disputesp8
According to the majority, the only time that the prOVISIons of a
particular head of power can be used 10 restrict the terms of another
head of power is where the text of the first mentioned head of power
contains a positive restriction or prohibition ofgeneral application.69
So, for example, the Commonwealth could not use the corporations
power to pass laws regulating Stale banking not extending beyond
the limits of the State concerned, as this would offend the express,
general prohibition contained in S 51(xiii), viZ the phrase 'other than
State banking'.70 The majority declined to extend this restriction to a
negative implication that the express words of s 5 1(xxxv) contained
an unexpressed prohibition (cf a direct prohibition) against
67 '(The] error is compounded if the conclusion is reached about the "real" or "true" or
"proper" eharncter of a law proceeds from ... the mischaracterisation of the subject
matter of s 51(xx:w) as "indu~trial relation~n. Resort to undefined concepts of
"industrial affairs", "industrial relations". and "industrial matters" (<Ill of which have
different meanings) should not be pennitled to obscure the fact that s 51(x){xv) uses
none of the~e expressions; it speaks of "industrial disputes" ': New South Wales 11
Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR I. 19151] (Glecson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon
and Crennall JJ).
68 New SoMh Wales \' Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR I, 61 [203j (Gleeson CJ.
GumtllOW, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ).
69 Ibid 65 [2191 (Gleeson CJ. Gummow. Hayne. Heydon and Crennan JJ).
70 See Bourke \. Stale Bank of New South Wales (1990) 170 CLR 276, as discussed in
New Somh Wales v Comlllonweolfh (2006) 231 ALR 1,65 (219]-[2211 (Gleeson CJ.
Gummow, Hayne. Heydon and Crennan JJ).
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alternative means for the Commonwealth to regulate industrial
relations generally. Instead, it adopted in its entirety what had been
stated in Re Pacific Coal in 2000 by Gleeson Cl:
[I)t is one thing to say that the nature of the power [under s
51(xxxv)] is such that it deals with instituting and maintaining a
system of conciliation and arbitration, and it is only through such a
system that conditions of employment'may be regulated under s
51(xxxv); it is another thing to find some negative implication
amounting to a prohibition against the Parliament enacting any law
which has the effect of altering the conditions of employment. ..
there is no such negative implication, and no such prohibition.?!
E The Federal Balance
1 The Federal Balance as limiting the scope of the
Corporations Power
Given the plaintiffs' invocation of the federal balance in the Work
Choices Case, and the expansive construction of the corporations
power unambiguously articulated by the majority in response, one
must ask whether there i any scope for any limitation upon the
construction of the corporations power (or indeed any of the other
placita in s 51) by reference to concerns about the federal balance
between the States and the Commonwealth?
It appears not. In the Work Choices Case the majority is dismissive
of what it labels as the 'social consequences' of its expansive
construction of the corporations power:
Reference has often been made in the cases to what are said to be
the possible consequences of concluding that a law whose object
of command is only constitutional corporations is a valid law. In
Huddart, Parker Riggins J spoke of possibilities that he saw as
distorting constitutional arrangements ... In part reference to such
consequences seeks to present possible social consequences that it
71 (2000) 203 CLR 346, 359-60 as extracted with approval in New Sowh Wales v
Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR I, 67-8 [2281 (Gleeson CJ, GUInmow, Hayne,
Heydon and Crennan JJ) (references omitted). For a further discussion of this point.
see Ford, above n 5. 156-9.
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is said could flow if further legislation is enacted ... as a reason to
confine the reach of legisJative power. Section 51 (xx), like other
powers, should not be given a meaning narrowed by an
apprehension of extreme examples and distorting possibilities of
its application to future laws. 72
Southern Cross University Law Review
Thus, according to the majority, there is no basis for taking a
'different approach'73 to the corporations power.
Moreover, the majority finds the notion of the federal balance
hopelessly ill defined and without content as a general delimiting
principle in construing Commonwealth legislative power:
Thus when it is said that there is a point at which the legislative
powers of the federal Parliament and the legislative powers of the
States are to be divided lest the federal balance be disturbed, how
is that point to be identified?... what exactly is the content of the
proposition that a particular constIUction of s 51 (xx) would, or
would not, impermissibly alter the federal balance?... [T]o be
valuable, the proposition that a particular construction of s 51(xx)
would or would not impermissibly alter the federal balance,
must have content, and the plaintiffs make no attempt to define
that content. 74
2 The Melbourne Corporation Principle & the Corporations
Power
In appealing to the notion of the federal balance, the plaintiffs
understandably made reference to the 'Melbourne Corporation
principle', so named after the High Court's 1947 decision in
- 98 -
72 New Soulh Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 23\ ALR \,57 [187]-f\88) (G1eeson CJ,
Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ) (references omitted), contra 147 [541]
(Kirby J). in anticipation of this point. see Ford, above n 5, 156.
73 Re Dingjan; Ex parte Wagner (\995) \83 CLR 323. 345 (Dawson J) as refen:ed to in
New South Wales \! Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR \, S6 [1831 (Gleeson CJ.
Gummow Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ).
74 New SOIah Wales \I Commonwealth (2006) 23\ ALR 1, 59-60 [\951-[196] (Gleeson
CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ), ef 2 I2-3 [741], 224 [7721 ('Sight
should never be lost of the verity that the ConsLitution is a constitution for a federation.
and that it provides for a federal balance'), 226 [781J, 234 [797] (Callinan J).
"
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81
75 (I947)74CLR31.
76 lbid 82 (Dixon J).
77 Ibid 80 (Dixon J).
78 Ibid. For a discussion of the Melbourne Corporation principle, see Hanks et ai, above
n 27, 590-626; G. Wimerton et al, Australian Federal Constitutional Law (2"" ed,
2007) 963-1035; Blackshield & Williams. above n 27,1142-68.
79 See Strickland v Roda Concrete Pipes Lld (1971) 124 CLR 468, 485 (Barwick Cl).
80 Barneu, above n 5, 124; see also Al11elia Simpson, 'The Australian Education Union
Case: A Quiet Revolution?' (1998) 7(1) Griffith Law Rel'iew 30.
See. eg, Victoria v Commonwealth (l971) 122 CLR 353 ('Payroll Tax Case'), 372
(Barwick CJ), 399, 401,403 (Windeyer J), 421, 423-6 (Gibbs J); State Chamber of
Commerce and Industr." I' Commonwealth (1968) 163 CLR 329; Tasmanian Dam Case
(1983) 158 CLR I, 128, 139 (Mason Cl), 280-1 (Deane J). 214-5 (Brennan J);
Richardsol1 v Forestry Commission (1988) 164 CLR 261; Western Australia l'
Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373 ('NaTive Title Act Case'), 481 (Mason CJ.
Brennan. Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh 11).
Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth,75 The principle provides
that '[t]he Constitution predicates [the State Governments']
continued existence as independent entities';76 therefore, federal
power cannot be used 'for a purpose of restricting or burdening [a]
State in the exercise of its constitutional powers',77 as this would
'bling into question the independence from Federal control of [a]
State in the discharge of- its functions'. 78
Since the High Court's decision in 1920 in Engineers 'exploded' the
'reserve powers doctrine' ,79 some commentators have identified the
Melbourne Corporation principle as a means of maintaining a
federal balance between the powers of the Commonwealth and the
States. Barnett, for example, has suggested that the High Court
abandon its 'case by case' application of the Melbourne Corporation
principle, and instead consider the question 'when account is taken
of the particular legislation before the court in light of other
legislative, and perhaps even executive, measures undertaken by the
Commonwealth, is the capacity of the States to play a practical role
in the Federation significantly impaired or curtailed?' 80
Notwithstanding the Melbourne Corporation principle's not
infrequent invocation by the States before the High Court since
1947,81 there are only three cases (albeit two relatively recent)
where the High Court has used the principl to invalidate
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Thus, according to the majority, the Melbourne Corporation
principle provided no assistance to the plaintiffs in the Work Choices
Commonwealth legislation.82 The Melbourne Corporation principle
must now also be assessed in the sobering light of the majority's
treatment of it in the Work Choices Case.
The majority in the Work Choices Case take a dourly minimalist
approach to the Melbourne Corporation principle.83 Reiterating
Dixon J's observation in Melbourne Corporation that the
constitutional framers 'appear. .. to have conceived the States as
bodies politic whose existence and nature are independent of the
powers allocated to them' ,84 the majority emphatically reject the
contention that the principle has anything to say about the balance or
allocation of legislative functions between the States and the
Commonwealth:
82 Queensland Electrici~y Commission v Commonwealth (1985) 159 CLR 192; Re
Australian Education Union; Ex parte Victoria (1995) 184 CLR 188; Austin v
Commonwealth (2003) 215 CLR 185. Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416
(,Industrial Relations Case') is excluded from the list as the application of the
Melbourne Corporation principle in that case resulted in the reading down of
Commonwealth legislation 'so as not to impact on the employment conditions of
higher level public selvants, the hiring policies of the States, the detennination of the
length of a State employee's tenn of employment, and the ability of States to ·sack
people on the basis of redundancy' (Sarah Joseph and Melissa Ca~tan, Federal
Constitutional Law: A Contemporary View (2"6 ed, 2006) 260), rather than the
invalidation o[Commonwealth legislation.
83 Contra Callinan J: see, eg, New SoUTh Wales \I Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR 1,230
[787].
84 Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31, 82 as extracted in New
South Wales l' Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR 1,59 [195] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow,
Hayne, Heydon 1md Crennan JJ).
85 New South Wales 11 Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR 1 59 [194] (Gleeson Cl,
Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ) (emphasis added), cf 149 [550] (Kirby l).
And because the [State government] entltles, whose continued
existence is predicated by the Constitution, are polities, they are to
continue as separate bodies politic each having legislative,
executive and judicial functions. But this last observation does not
identify the content of any of those functions. It does not say what
those legislative functions are to be.85
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86 New South Wales \' Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR 1, 147 [5421-[5431, 149 [5491.
See also 225-6 [7791 (CalJinan J).
87 Slewart, above n 5, 5 referring to Re Australian Educalion Union; ex parle Victoria
([995) 184 CLR 188,232-3. For a further discussion of this point see Williams, above
n 39,507-10.
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Case. Only the minority justices, Kirby and Callinan JJ were
prepared to adopt a more expansive approach to the principle. They
determined that the Work Choices Act was invalid largely by
reference to the likely overall consequences for the States if the
legislation were found to be valid. As expressed by Kirby J:
In my view, the use of section 51(xx) exhibited in [the Work
Choices Act] carries with it, if valid, a very large risk of
destabilising the federaJ character of the Australian Constitution.
When such a conclusion is reached only a formulaic approach to
the law of the Constitution would lead this court to ignore it. In
effect, the risk to which I refer is presented by a shift in
constitutional realities from the present mixed federal
arrangements to a kind of optionaJ or 'opportunistic' federalism in
which the Federal Parliament may enact laws in almost every
sphere of what has hithetto been a State field of lawmaking... it
would be completely contrary to the text, structure and design of
the Constitution for the states to be reduced, in effect, to service
agencies of the Commonwealth. 86
In the light of the joint majority judgment in the Work Choices Case,
the Melbourne Corporation principle's only application to the States
in terms of the Work Choices legislation is likely to be in precluding
federal regulation of employment conditions for 'high level' State
officials and in barring any attempt by the Commonwealth to
determine the composition of a State's workforce.87 Given that the
Work Choices Case was litigated as a demun-er, these issues did not
arise for consideration in that case. They' may be the subject of
fUlther High court litigation at a later date.
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V KIRBY AND CALLlNAN JJ'S DISSENTING JUDGMENTS
A General Comments
Given the strength of the five justice joint majority judgment in the
Work Choices Case, this paper focuses primarily on that judgment,
specifically in relation to the majority justices' delimitation of the
scope of the Commonwealth's corporations power, and the majority
judgment's political implications. Nevel1heless, the two dissenting
judgments of Kirby and Callinan JJ are botb lengthy and significant
and address issues of relevance to this paper.
The minority justices read down the corporations power by reference
both to the provisions of s 51 (xxxv) and to the effect of an
(impermissibly) broad reading of the corporatioQs power on the
position of the States and, by implication, the federal balance.
B The Federal Balance, the Corporations Power &
Constitutional Interpretation
Contrary to the approach taken by the majOlity, neither dissenting
Justice expresses a decided view of the scope of the corporations
power, although Callinan J appears to favour the internal/external
dichotomy urged upon the court by the plaintiffs.88 For the
dissenting Justices the issue of the scope of the corporations power
is subsumed within the broader question of the federal balance - 'the
central issue in these proceedings is not, as such, the corporations
power, standing alone'89 - and specifically, the likely consequences
for the States if the corporations power is construed broadly enough
to validate the Work Choices Act.90 When the Work Choices Act is
viewed as a whole by reference to its 'overall design',91 it is invalid
because of its consequences for the States and the federal balance.
88 New South Wales I' Commol1wealrh (2006) 231 ALR L 250 [8411-18421. 262 [8801, ef
164-5 [6147 (Kirby J).
89 lbid 131 [484\ (Kirby J).
90 Ibid 146-7 [539H540\, 164 f611J (Kil'by J). 233 {794] (CalJinan J).
91 tbidl50 [5541 (Kirby J).
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Kirby J proceeds from the truism that 'the Constitution must be read
as a whole and as a coherent document'92 to assert that 'the abiding
object of the task at hand is to secure an interpretation of the
constitutional provisions that gives harmonious effect to the entire
document'93 as 'one coherent instrument of government' ,94 Callinan
J mounts a more d.irect assault on the High Court's seminal 1920
decision in the Engineers Case - 'it is a case which does not deserve
the reverence which has been accorded to it'95 - and the strict
textualism that that case espoused is inconsistent both with the
democratic impetus behind the drafting of the Constitution and its
passage through the Imperial Parliament, and with 'current orthodox
purposive techniques of statutory interpretation'.96 For both Justices,
upholding the validity of the Work Choices Act would 'carry with it
a large risk of destabilising the Federal character of the Australian
Constitution' ,97
C The Relationship between the corporations power and
s 51(xxxv)
Both Callinan and Kirby JJ make pointed reference to the history
and litigation surrounding s 51(xxxv) as providing 'a constitutional
context in which, for more than a century, legislators and courts...
assumed that any law with respect to industrial disputes had to
conform' .98 While each arrives at the same conclusion - that the
corporations power must be read down by reference to s 51(xxxv)
such that the entirety of the Work Choices Act is invalid - their
judgments again have different emphases. Callinan J maintains that
those involved in the drafting of the Constitution never envisaged
92 lbid 127 (469].
93 lbid 128 [472].
94 lbid 133 (491].
95 Ibid 214 [747].
96 fbid 212-3 [741].
97 Ibid 147 [542] (Kirby J). See also 223 [7721, 225 [779], 230 [230]. 234 [797]. 275
[913] (CalJinan J).
98 Ibid 113-14 [431] (Kirby J). See also 114-17 [432]-[4421 (Kirby J), 235 [801]
(Callinan J).
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that the corporations power could bc used to regulate industrial
affairs,99 and that they intended there to be a division of power
between Federal and State Governments over interstate and
intrastate industrial disputes respectively. 100 Kirby J instead applies
the 'settled'lOl principle of construction articulated by Dixon Cl in
Attorney·General (Cth) v Schmjdt CSchmidt')102 to restrict the ambit
of the corporations power. By construing s 51(xxxv) as imposing
two 'safeguards, restrictions or qualifications' 103 on Commonwealth
legislation with respect to industrial disputes, namely, (i)
interstateness; and (ii) independent resolution by way of conciliation
and arbitration, his Honour concJudes that the Commonwealth
cannot validly pass a law with respect to industrial disputes which
lacks those guarantees and overrides those limitations by use of
another general head of power, such as the corporations poweL l04
o A Critique of the Minority Judgments
The judgments of Kirby J and Callinan J are inconsistent with the
evolved - at least since the High Court's decision in Engineers in
1920 - corpus of High Court jurisprudence on the question of
characterisation of the Commonwealth's legislative powers. Enough
has been said already in this paper about the majority's application
of basic principles of constitutional construction, such as the
99 lbid 195 [7061.
100 lbid 189 f690j.
101 NeH' South Wales \' Commonwealth (2006) 23l ALR I. 137 [504].
102 (1961) 105 CLR 361. The principle in Schmidt holds that 'it is in accordance with the
soundest principles of intcrpretation to treat thc confelTal of an express power, subjcct
to a safeguard. restriction or qualification. to legislate on aparticular subject matter or
to aparticular effect as inconsistent with any construction of other powers conferred in
the context which would mean that they included the Same subject or produced the
same effect and so authorised the same kind of legislation but without the safeguard,
restriction or qualification': see Nintendo Co Ltd v (en/rollies Systems Pty Ltd (994)
181 CLR 134, 160 (Mason Cl, Brennan, Deane. Toohey. Gaudron and McHugh H) as
e"tracted by Kirby J in New South Wales \' Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR I, 136-7
[503].
103 Attorney.General (Crh)]I Schmidt (1961) 105 CLR 361, 371 (Di:l\Qn Cl).
104 Ne .... South Wales \' Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR l. 113 {430J, 138 [510]. See also
248 {8341 (Callinan 1).
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acceptance of dual characterisation and the focus on the 'rights,
duties, powers or privileges' as grounding the process of
characterisation. By contrast, if the approach of the dissenters had
prevailed, it would have represented a fundamental diversion of 'the
flow of constitutional law into new channels' 105 and produced
pronounced uncertainty on questions of constitutional interpretation.
It is now well established that the heads of power within s 51 are not
to be read down by reference to each other (subject to the principle
in Schmidt) , or by reference to inchoate concerns for the federal
balance. For example, the interstate and international tTade and
commerce power in s 51(i) was construed in Re Maritime Union of
Australia; Ex parte CSL Pacific .Shipping Inc to permit the
regulation of the relationship between employers and maritime
employees in a manner that falls outside of s 51(xxxv);106 the
defence power in s 51(vi) was construed in Pidoto v Victoria as
unlimited by the terms of s 51(xxxv), at least in times of national
emergency; 107 and the 'treaty implementation aspect'108 of the
external affairs power in s 51(xxix) has been validly used to halt
intrastate industrial development,109 and to incorporate employment
standards promoted by the International Labour Organisation into
domestic law in a manner partially outside the scope of s
Sl(XXXV).110 Kirby J's attempts to explain these decisions by
referenc to the 'very special'] 11 nature of the defence and external
105 Vicwria l' Commonwealth (t 971) ]22 CLR 353, 396 (Windeyer 1).
106 (2003) 214 CLR 397, a unanimous decision of seven justices. See also New South
Wales l' Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR 1,66 (224) (Gleeson CJ, Gurnmow, Hayne,
Heydon and Crennan 11) contra 156-7 [5781-[582] (Kirby J).
107 (1943) 68 CLR 87, a detetmination of a bench of five. See also Ne.",' South Wales v
Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR 1,66-8 [2271-[229) (Gleeson Cl, Gummow, Hayne,
Heydon and Crennan JJ) conrra 152-4 [5621-[5691 (Kirby 1); 238 [8101 (Ca\linan 1).
108 See, eg, Joseph & Castan, above n 82, 111-27.
109 Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, cf New South Wales v Commonwealth
(2006) 231 ALR I, ] 86 [6791 (Callinan 1).
110 Victoria I' COl11monwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416 ('Industrial Relations Act Case')
contra New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR t, 154-6 [570]-[576]
(Kirby J);
1I 1 New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR I, 154 [569] (Kil'by J).
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affairs power,112 whilst maintaining that the corporations power
should be so read down, strikes the author as unconvincing.
Specifically, Kirby J's application of the principle articulated in
Schmidt to limit the scope of the corporations power by reference to
s 51(xxxv) is misconceived. For the Schmidt principle to apply to the
Work Choices Act it must be an Act on the 'particular subject
matter' of conciliation and arbitration or it must 'produce the same
effect' as a law on conciliation and arbitration. 113 The Work Choices
Act fulfils neither criterion. There is no mention of either
conciliation or arbitration in its objects clause; 114 on the contrary, its
express purpose is to create an industr.ial relations system which
'ensur[es] that, as far as possible, the primary responsibility for
determining matters affecting the employment relationship rests with
the employer and employees at the workplace or enterprise level' .115
WhHe federalism may be desirable as an 'overriding constitutional
arrangement', as 'contributing to diversity and experimentation in
law making, intergovernmental co operation within the Common-
wealth and the protection of individual rights',116 it is too abstract a
principle to detennine the precise content of a specific
Commonwealth head of power. For example, both Calhnan J and
Kirby J are adamant that the curtailment of the State industrial
relations systems by the Commonwealth's use of the corporations
power to regulate workplace relations is invalid because 'there
would be little of substance left for the States'117 and that this
therefore upsets the federal balance. This smacks of an arbitrary
political judgment. The effective obliteration of most (if not all) of
the States' individual industrial relations systems does not obliterate
the State Governments themselves, as evidenced by the Government
of the State of Victoria's continued ability to thrive, notwithstanding
112 NewSourh Wales "Commollwealrh (2006) 231 ALR 1, 152 [5621, 154 (569l
113 See above 11 102.
114 Section 3 of the Amended Act.
115 Section 3(d) of the Amended Act. Sce also Bamell, ahove n 5, 114.
116 Ne\\" SOl/Ill Wales \' Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR 1, liB [4461 (Kitby J).
117 New Soulh Wales \' Commollwealrh (2006) 231 ALR 1.233 [7951 (Callinan Jl.
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its refenal in 1996 of its industrial relations powers to the
Commonwealth. II8
VI POLITICAL CONTEXT
A A Broader Context
It has been argued thus far that the majority's reasoning with respect
to the corporations power in the Work Choices Case has merely built
on orthodox approaches to constitutional interpretation. As such,
there is little of great jurisprudential significance in the majority
judgment. . The significance of the High Court's decision lies
elsewhere and must be assessed by reference to its broader political
and social implications, outside of the boundaries of a narrow,
legalistic analysis. The starting point for that assessment is
historical.
B History
The insertion of s Sl(xxxv) into the text of the Constitution in the
1890s was a victory for liberal 'progressives',119 with the
constitutional prescription of conciliation and arbitration to resolve
industrial disputes extending beyond anyone State opening up 'a
new province for law and order'120 and providing the new
Commonwealth 'with the creative opportunity to civilise
capitalism'.121 The advent of the 'new economy' in the mid 1980s
118 By means of the Commonwealth Powers (Industrial Relations) Act 1996 (Vie).
119 See, Tim Rowse, 'Elusive Middle Ground: A Political History' in loe Issac and Stuart
Maclntyre (eds), The New Province for Law and Order (2004) 17,20-1,24-5; James
Macken, Australian Industrial Laws (2'od ed, 1980) 10-13; see also New South Wales v
Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR 1, 190-2 [6961-[697] (Callinan J).
120 As coined by Higgins J in his article 'A New Province for Law and Order: Industrial
Peace Through Minimum Wage and Arbitration' (l915) 29 Harvard Law Review 13 as
refened to in New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR 1, 193 [699]
(Calllnan J).
121 Rowse, above n 119, 22. For a discussion of the place of the Australian industrial
relations system as a 'key institution .. _that served as the basis on which social policy
was reconciled', see Judy Fudge, 'Precarious Employment in Australia and Canada:
The Road 10 Labour Law Refonn' (2006) 19 Australian Journal of Labour Law J06.
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brouo-ht with it sustained pressures to transform Australia's
:::>
indusuial relations system.1 22 The Howard Government's Work
Choices Act dramatically accelerates that transformation, but does so
in a way that will almost certainly favour individualised enterprise
bargaining over unionised collective bargaining. 123 The High
COUlt's decision in the Work Choices Case upholding the validity of
that legislation will have the effect of rendering s Sl(xxxv), with its
textual restrictions of interstateness and of the prescription of
conciliation and arbitration, largely otiose.1 24 The passage of the
Work Choices Act and its validation by the High COUlt are therefore
both ostensibly significant victories for the adherents of a 'neo
liberal' approach to labour law. 125 As described by Murray, with
reference to the legislative haste which marked the passage of the
Work Choices Act:
For a brief discussion of the international history of the notion of conciliation and
arbitration as a means of regulating industrial relations, see Ron McCallum, 'The New
Work Choices Laws; Once Again Australia Borrows Foreign Labour Law Concepts'
(2006) 19 Australian Journal oj'Labour Low 98, 100-10 l.
122 Editorial (2006) 19 Australian Journal ojLabour Low 95, 96.
123 Anthony Forsyth and Carolyn Sutherland, 'Collective Labour Relations Under Siege:
the Work Choices Legislation and Collective Bargaining' (2006) 19 Australian
Journal of Labour Law 183; see also Andrew Stewart, 'Work Choices in Overview:
Big Bang or Slow Burn?' [2006116(2) Economic and Labour Relations Review 25.
124 For a discussion of the likely demise of the arbitration power, see Stewart & WilIiams,
above n 5, 162-5 ('RIP Industrial Arbitration?'), although as pointed out by the authors
(at 165) the use of the corporations power does not of itself necessitate the
abandonment of conciliation and arbitration. Section 51 (x.x.xv) may stiLI be relevant
however in providing a head of legislative power for Commonwealth laws re the
settlement or prevention of interstate indushial disputes between two non corporate
entities, as uncommon as such disputes are in reality likely to be: see New South Wales
I' Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR I [4741 (Kirby J). Re the decline of industrial
awards, see Rosemary Owens, 'Working Precariously: The Safety Net After Work
Choices' (2006) 19 Ausrralian Journal oj'Labour Low 161. 177; MUD'ay, above n 14.
125 For a discussion of the Work Choices Act in the context of the ideology of neo
liberalism, see, eg, McCallum, above n 121; Fudge, above n 121. For analy. es of the
neglllive impact of the Work Choices Acr on the position of employees generally, see,
eg, Marilyn Pittard, 'Back to the Future: Unjust Termination of Employment under the
Work Choices Legislation (2006) 19 Ausrralian Joumal oj Labour Law 225; Joel
Fetter, 'Work Choices and Australian Workplace Agreemenl~' (2006) 19 Ausrralian
Journal of Lobour Law 210; Shae McCrysral, 'Smothering the Right to StTike: Work
Choices and Industrial Action' (2006) J9 Ausrralian Journal of Labour Law 198:
Anthony Forsyth and Carolyn Sutherland. 'Collective Labour Relations Under Siege:
the Work Choices Legislation and Collective Bargaining' (2006) 19 Ausrralian
Journal oj'Labour Law 183; Owens, above n'124.
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Law-making of this kind suggests something of the triumphant
settling of scores against an old enemy, In a real sense, the
traditional labour law system... is that old enemy... Australian
unions were promoted and gained status through the links with the
federal tribunal under the Constitutional conciliation and
arbitration power. Unions in Australia are also structurally linked
to the main opposition party in the federal Parliament, the
Australian Labor Party. It therefore makes good political sense for
the government to move against this traditional foe, especially
since it had since July 2005 a majority in both Houses of
Parliament. As one member of the govemment put it, 'there is only
one industry in Australia that needs to fear this legislation - the
trade union bureaucracy and, of course, their sycophants in this
place' ,126
It is therefore ironical that the expansive interpretation of the
corporations power affirmed in the Work Choices Case is likely
significantly to increase the Commonwealth Government's powers
to regulate economic activity, an objective historically associated
more with the Australian Labor Party127 (at least prior to the
deregulatory refonns of the Hawke and Keating Labor Governments
126 Mun-ay, above n 14, 365. The member of the government referred to is Wilson
Tuckey. MHR.
127 The Fisher Labor government of 1910-13 made two (unsuccessful) attempts through
referenda (in 1910 and 1913) to widen the Commonwealth's constitutional powers,
including re Ihe nationalisation of monopolies and re the operation of business and
commerce: see Brian McKinlay, A ShorT HisTOIY a/The Australian Lobar ParTy (1981)
34-5. The Curtin Labor government of 1940-45 put the 'Fourteen Powers Bill' to
referendum on 19 August 1944, having introduced the Bill to Parliament in 1942. The
package would have given the Commonweallh extensive powers over the national
economy. It was defeated, failing to gain a majority in all States bar South Australia
and Western Australia: see, Ross McMullin, The LighT all The Hill (1991) 229-32. The
Chifley Labor government of 1945-49 sought to confer power on the Commonwealth
through referenda, inter alia, over 'industrial employment' (pUl unsuccessfully on 28
September 1946) and 'rents and prices' (put unsuccessfully on 29 May 1948): see,
Tony Blackshield and George WiJliams, AUSTralian COllsTituTional Law and Theory (4th
ed. 2006) 1449-50. In 1973 the Whitlam Labor government sought Commonwealth
control over prices and incomes, Both referenda were defetlted: ;;ee Blackshield &
Williams at 1450. See also New Sourh Wares \' Commonwealrh (2006) 231 ALR 1,42-
3 [127)-[130] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). 196-208
[708]-[735] (Callinan J).
J,
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which governed Australia federally from 1983 to 1996)128 than the
conservative Coalition parties,
C The Economic Base and the Constitutional Superstructure
The High Court's approach to the process of characterisation has
'made possible over the years a very substantial expansion of
Commonwealth legislative authority, without the need for securing
formal amendment of the Constitutional text' ,129 That approach, and
the willingness of the States 10 refer their powers to the
Commonwealth, have not however been the only factors in
expanding Commonwealth powers in the hundred years since
Federation, The growth in the power and prevalence of corporations
over the 20th century, aided and abetted by the ascendancy of an
agenda of privatisation and out sourcmg. means that the
Commonwealth's corporations power is far more significant than it
was in 1901. The Corrunonwealth therefore now has considerable
power, via the direct regulation of the corporation, to regulate
economic activity.130 In the crudest Marxist terms, primary changes
in the economic base have determined the epiphenomenal legal
super structure,131 causing the Commonwealth's legislative powers
radically to change notwithstanding that they are 'frozen'132 in their
textual form.
128 For a discussion of those reforms within the broader, Labor social democratic tradition.
see. eg, Don Watson. Recoflecrions of0 Bleeding Heon (2002) 240, 264. 316-7.
129 Ford, above n 5,147_
130 The Amended Act, predicated <IS it is upon various heads of Commonwealth legislative
power. is nOI able to' cover the entirety of the Australian workforcc. The Australian
Bureau of Statistics figures used in the litigation before thc High Court and cited in the
judgment suggestlhat approximately 15 per cent of the workforce will not be regulated
by the Amended Act. This would include many workers previously regulated undcr
State awards. See New Sourh Wales \' Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR 1, 16-7 [45]
(Gleeson Cl. Gummow. Bayne, Heytlon and Crennan JJ).
131 Ne..... South Wales v Commonwealrh (2006) 231 ALR 1,67 [2SI, 40-1 [!2IHI22]
(Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ).
132 Sec, Gcoffrey Sawer, Australian Federalism in the CourtS (1967) 20ft
'Constitutionally speaking, Australia is the frozen continent'.
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o The Quixotic Corporatisation Thesis
McCallum expresses pessimism about the future of an industrial
relations system based on the corporations power, as one which will
not recognise the uniquely human dimension of the employment
relationship. 133 He contends that 'the words of every specified head
of federal power shape the laws enacted in reliance upon it' and that
the corporations power (like all heads of power in the Constitution)
is itself a form of constitutional 'DNA'.134 Consequently, the
supplanting of the industrial relations power by the corporations
power will lead inevitably to the 'corporatisation of Australian
labour law' .135 This concern is shared by Kirby J in his dissenting
judgment in the Work Choices Case. He characterises s 51(xxxv) as
enshrining 'the ideal of "a fair go", due process, transparent
negotiations, and ultimately (where necessary), public disposition by
an independent decision maker' .136 His Honour warns that:
[s]uch elements of fairness would not necessarily be assured by an
unlimited focus of federal law on the activities of employers as
constitutional corporations. Under that power, attention is
addressed to the corporation whicb is the employer, not, as such,
the employment or the workplace reJationship.137
With respect, both McCallum and Kirby J tilt quixotically at a
windmill.
It is a given that the changes ushered in by the Work Choices Act
obliterate much of the industrial relations history and culture in this
country.138 This results, however, not from the constitutional head of
power upon which the lawfulness of the Work Choices Act rests, but
directly [Tom the objectives and substance of the Work Choices Act
133 McCallum, above n 5; see also New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR I,
118 [4461(Kirby 1).
134 McCallum, above n 5, 461.
135 lbid 467.
136 New Somh Wales " Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR J, 140 [5191-
137 Ibid 118 [4461. See also 163 [6091-
138 lbid 115 f115HKirby J).
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itself. While it is true that the textual restnctlons contained in s
51(x.xxv) have shaped the Australian industrial relations system,139
the corporations power, as a 'super placitum',140 has now been
defined so broadly that the content of labour and industrial relations
law in the Work Choices era and beyond will be overwhelmingly
shaped by political and economic considerations, rather than legal or
constitutional ones. 141 To take that other 'super placitum', the
external affairs power, as one point of comparison, one cannot
accurately say that the Commonwealth legislation unsuccessfully
challenged in the Tasmanian Dams Case was any less protective of
the environment because it was passed 'with respect to' external
affairs. 142
As pointed out by Stewart and Williams, the use of the corporations
power as the primary mechanism to regulate industrial relations does
not of itself necessitate the abandonment of 'industrial fairness'l43
or independent arbjtration as a system that embodies 'egalitarian and
idealistic values'144 that had 'profoundly influenced the nature and
aspirations of Australian society':145
But if there is nothing about the c0'1'0rations power that dictates
the maintenance of those '{alues, then nor is there anything that
requires their abandonment. It is open to a future Commonwealth
Government to use the corporations power to reinvigorate the
federal award system, to restore the role of the [Australian
Industrial Relations Commission) (or some successor) in resolving
disputes, and to make a renewed commitment to the principle of
industrial fair play - if it wants lo.146
139 McCallurn, above n 5, 462-3.
140 Craven. above 11 23. 206.
141 Contra McCallurn, above n 5. 467-9.
142 Thc decision in the Tasmania Dams Case was al.<;o based on the corporations power in
addition to the external affairs power: see. eg, Commonwealth \' Tasmania (1983) 158
CLR I, 151-2 (Mason n. 269-70 (Deane 1).
143 New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR I, 140 [5191.
144 Ibid 144 [530].
145 Ibid.
146 Stewart & Williams. above n 5.165. see also 172-3; see also Stewart. above n 5.18.
See also below n 158. re the ALP's currCllI industrial relations policy.
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E Post the Work Choices Case - The Australian Labor Party,
the Left, Corporatisation & Federalism
At the conclusion of his paper 'The Australian Constitution and the
Shaping of Our Federal and State Labour Laws', 147 McCallum
shares his thoughts on globalisation, and the growing influence of
trans-national corporations:
Economic globalisation has increased the fragility of nation states
like Australia because they are more vulnerable to the economic
pressures of trans national capital than was previously the case. In
truth, nation states like Australia have to share economic power
with corporations ... As government coffers shrink in size through
cuts in direct and indirect taxation, the social slack is being taken
up by the corporate sector. If corporate power is further
unleashed... the corporate sector will obtain a huge increase in
power and influence to the great detriment of the Australian nation
and especially to the long term disadvantage of working women
and men. 148
McCallum is right to sound the tocsin on the growth of the political
power of corporations in our increasingly deregulated and globalised
nation. 149 To respond to that challenge, the Australian nation's
strongest government, the Commonwealth Government, needs to be
armed with a clear, broad constitutional power to regulate
corporations. 150 As summarised by Gray:
[O)nly the national government can exercise the kind of Strong
control that is necessary over a corporation. The history of
corporate law in Australia has reflected an eventual recognition of
the need for federal regulation of the topic, and a movement away
from the original position where State law regulated companies ...
The point is this then in relation to the corporations power - the
\47 McCallum, above n 5.
148 lbid 469.
149 See also Judy Fudge, above n 121, 106. For a brief discussion of globalisation as a
rationale for the changes intmduced by the Work Choices Act. see Murray, above n 14.
361-2.
150 Contra Ne ..... South Wales I' Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR 1, 150-1 [5551-[5561. 164
[612] (Kirby J). See also Gray. above n 5.451.
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Commonwealth's ability to regulate corporations must be read
broadly because corporations dominate economic activity in
Australia, and the Commonwealth is responsible for the
economy.1S1
Prior to the High Court's decision in the Work Choices case, the
scope of the corporations power 'remain[ed] very much open'.152
After almost a century of equivocation, jn its emphatic joint majOllty
judgment in the Work Choices Case, the High Court has finally
provided the Commonwealth with a clear plenary power to legislate
with respect to corporations.
Some commentators have viewed a broad reading of the
corporations power as providing the opportunity to deregulate wages
as 'affecting the competitiveness of Australian business 'l53 in order
to 'produce labour market arrangements which are compatible with
an internationalised economy',I54 It is equally valid to speculate
how, with its virtually untrammelled power directly to regulate
corporations and indirectly to regulate economic activity, a 'social
democratic' Commonwealth Labor government committed to a
rejection of 'market fundamentalism'155 might in the future use its
powers. It is not without significance that all bar one of the failed
referenda attempts to expand Commonwealth government control
over the national economy were initiatives of Labor govemments. 156
151 Gray, above n 5, 452 (footnotes omitted).
152 Williams, above n 39. 507. See also Slewart. above n 5,11.
153 See, ego Gray, above n 5, 453 and the various authorities he cite.~ in apparent support of
this proposition at 453-6.
154 Judilh Sloan. 'Until the End of Time: Labour Market Reform in Australia' (1992)
Al.wralian ECOllOmic Review 65, 66, as quoted in Gray. above n 5, 454.
155 Federal ALP leader Kevin Rudd, 'Child of Hayek', The Australian (Sydney), 20
Deeember 2006, 12, as quoted at the beginning of this paper.
156 The e:o;ception being the Constituliol! Alrewlion (lndustrv and Commerce) Bill 1926
(Cth) whieh was the initiative of the conservative Nationalist-Country Party coalition
government lead by Stanlcy Bruce PM: ~ec New SOll1h Wales \' CommQllwealrh (2006)
231 ALR 1. 204-6 [724J-[7261 (Callinan 1). This bill was however supported by the
Labor Pm1Y. then in opposition:.sce reference 10 the words of Opposition ~ader (and
leader of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party) Matt Charlton in New SQulh Wales I'
CommOllwealrh (2006) 231 ALR 1,205 [7261 (Callinan J); see 1IIso at 1191451]
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By way of comparison, in 1973 and 1974 the Whitlam Labor
government sought to promote equal pay for women. Defeated in its
attempts to seek specific powers over prices and incomes in the
referendum of 8lh Decem~er 1973, it made submissions in support of
equal pay to the then Arbitration Commission. IS7 Now, in the
aftermath of the Work Choices Case, a future Labol' government
could directly regulate conditions of employment within corporate
employers, to introduce salary capping within the upper echelons of
corporate management, to fix prices and incomes in large sectors of
the economy and to set high and comprehensive minimum
conditions of employment, including severance and retirement
conditions. lS8
Moreover, as observed by Stewal't and Williams, although the Work
Choices Case concerned the constitutionality of laws concerning
industrial relations, the scope of the corporations power as delimited
by the majority in the Work Choices case is not confined to the
industrial relations context:
Centra] to the High Court's reasoning was a general statement
about the scope of the corporations power... This finding was
applied in the specific industrial relations context to uphold the
Work Choices law, but could equally be applied elsewhere in the
future. It is certainly not limited to anyone context, there being
nothing in the words of the power that could justify this. 159
(Kirby J). As observed in the Work Choices Case, most of these attempt have been
retrospectively superseded by t!le enlarged scope of the corporations power as affirmed
in that case, given the vastly increased role of the corporate entity in national economic
life.
157 See Evans, above n 8,26.
158 The current ALP policy on industrial relations, Fonvard with Fail11ess, commits the
ALP, if it wins government federally, to' 10 legislated nation!!1 employment standards
which will apply to all Australian employees' including conditions relating to four
weeks guaranteed annual leave, penalty rates on public.holidays, and redundancy pay;
see Australian Labor Party, Forward with Fairness (April 2007) ,
<http://www.alp.org.au/downloadlnowffwf finala.pdf> at 5 July 2007.
In implementing the plan the ALP states that 'Pln government, Labor will rely upon all
of the Constitutional powers available to it to legislate national industrial relations laws
to reduce complexity and duplication' (at 3).
] 59 Stewart & Williams, above n 5. 168.
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160 Analogous to its direct regulation under the Work Choices Act of some minimum
standards of pay and conditions: see, eg, the five 'key minimum entitlements' outlined
in s 171(2) of the Amended Act. The current platform of the Australian Labor Party,
under the heading 'Corporate Social Responsibility' states that 'Labor will introduce
policies that encourage... executive salary restraint and responsibility; decent
corporate standards for environmental protection ... [and] active participation by
companies in disadvantaged communities': Australian Labor Party, 2004 Pla.tform -
Cha.pter Two, Item 17 <http://www.alp.org.au/platformlchapter 02> at 30 January
2007. It remains a matter of speculation whether this stated position of
'encouragement' through 'policy' will ever become one of compulsion through
legislation.
161 Strickland v Roda Concrete Pipes Lld (1971) 124 CLR 468,490 (Barwick Cl) ('I
must nol be taken as suggesting that the question whether a particular law is a law
within the scope of [the corporations] power should be approached in any narrow or
pedantic manner').
162 Interestingly the Howard Government has chosen not to use the Work Choices Act as a
vehicle to introduce a national system of occupational health and safety regulation: see
Amended Act s 16, esp. s 16(2)(c), 16(3)(c).
163 Thai is, based on the same logic (and heads of power) as the Amended Act: see New
SOL/th Wales I' Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR I. 16-7 [451 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow,
Hayne, Heydon and Crennan 11).
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The Commonwealth's powers could extend therefore to mandate
places on boards of relevant corporations to employee
representatives, and to impose environmental standards on
corporations. 160 One may contrast this open field of Commonwealth
regulatory opportunity cleared by the majority's judgment in the
Work Choices Case, with the federal minefield that would have been
laid had the plaintiffs' 'narrow and pedantic'161 arguments been
successful.
Assume, for instance, that the High COUlt had adopted the plaintiffs'
argument that a distinction between the external and internal
activities of the corporation should circumscribe the operation of the
corporations power. At some point, a Commonwealth Labor govern-
ment might wish to establish a national system of occupational
health and safety regulation, effectively to supplant the differing
regim s in the six States. 162 If it could not reach agreement with six
separate State Governments, it may attempt to achieve legislative
coverage of approximately 85 per cent of the workforce by reliance
primarily on the corporations power,163 given that it has no specific
legislative head of power with respect to occupational health and
safety. But would such a law be a regulation of the external or the
Copyright of full Text rests w lh the original owner and, except as permitted under the Copyright Aa 1968, copy ng this copyright materialis prohibited without the permls.slon of the owner or
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c·
164 See, eg, Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vie) ss 21 (re 'empioyees'), 21(3)
(re 'independent contractors'), 23 (re 'other persons ').
165 Pursuant either to the 'express incidental power' (s 51 (xxxix)) or the 'implied
incidental power': see generally Hanks et aI above n 27, 42.
166 Similady, there have been numerous problems and limitations with the use of the
arbitration power as a principle sotlfce of federal regulation of industrial relations: see,
eg, Stewart, above n 5,2-4.
167 D Rose, 'Commentary', (\ 994) 14(3) Federal Law Review 251,254..
internal actlvltles of the corporation? That speculative question is
further complicated when one considers that current State
occupational health and safety laws, as one comprehensive
regulatory package, (rightfully and logically) protect both employees
and non employees, including independent contractors, and also
other third parties (such as members of the public) from hazards that
can arise from an employer's workplace. 164 Applying the plaintiffs'
first argument, the coverage of employees would be considered as
going to matters 'internal' to the corporation and would fall outside
of the scope of the corporations power, (unless it could be
characterised as 'incidental' to it, a further complication); 165
coverage of members of the public would presumably be categorised
as going to matters 'external' to the corporation and could be
covered, whereas the categorisation of legislation cov ring
independent contractors would be moot. The broad sweep of the
majority's construction of the corporations power, as found in the
Work Choices Case, cuts tins finical, federalistic Gordian knot. 166
To apply the words of Rose to the plaintiffs' attempts to limit the
scope of the corporations power by reference to a dichotomy
between the corporation's internal and external activities, '[t]he
limits on constitutional power might not be worth the social price
involved in distinctions that are complex and artificial in the real
world'.167
Of course, there still remain restraints on the Commonwealth's use
of the corporations power. Some commentators have suggested that
post the Work Choices Case, the High Court might revisit its
approach to detern1ining the identity of 'trading or financial
corporations' which currently extends the reach of the power to
corporations which engage in substantial or significant trading
activities ('the activities test'), even if they are a non profit
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168 See, eg, Siate Superannuation Board a/Victoria v Trade Practices Commission (1982)
150 CLR 282. For a discussion of the development of the 'activities' test, see John
Williams, above n 5, 7-8.
169 Given that the test has been developed in a "ignificant succession of cases': see John v
Federal Commissio'ner a/Taxation (1989) 166 CLR 417,438.
J70 Stewart & Williams, above n 5, 156.
171 Although there appears to be no constillltional limitation on the Commonwealth
legislating to cover these 'non excluded' areas if it wished to do so: see StewaIt &
Williams, above n 5, 156-7.
172 An outcome prefigured by the dissenting justices in the Work Choices Case: see New
South Wales I' Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR I, 119 [4511 (Kirby J). 224-34 [7741-
[7971 (Callinan J).
..,-~
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organisation, or incorporated for non commercial purposes. 168 If the
High Court does either discard the activities test, or curtail its reach
in some way by articulating a hitherto unenunciated limitation upon
it, then this will be a significant limitation on the scope of the
corporations power in regulating a range of corporations, including a
range of statutory corporations, such as local councils, universities
and public hospitals. It is contended however that a radical
reappraisal of the activities test is unlikely.l69
The 'national system' of industrial relations purportedly created by
the Work Choices Act 'is not a truly national system'.J70 It does not
include many employees who are employed by non constitutional
corporations; state legislation still applies in 'non excluded' subjects
such as workers compensation and occupational health and
safety. I7I Despite these limitations, the dramatic expansion of the
Commonwealth powers over industrial relations in the Australian
economy will, of necessity, result in a diminution of the powers of
the States. I72 Corporations (whether public or private) play a
significant and increased role in areas traditionally the primary or
exclusive responsibility of State governments. The pervasive
presence of the corporate entity combined with the breadth of the
corporations power as construed in the Work Choices Case, allows
- 118 -
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the Commonwealth, if it so wishes, to 'cover fields>J 73 traditionally
the responsibility of the States. 174
Time, and the political alignments of State and Federal governments,
will tell whether the progress of Australian Federalism post the
Work Choices Case is characterised by a cooperative 'referral
approach',175 or 'oPPOltunistic federalism', 176 with the Common-
wealth 'cherry picking' responsibilities from the States where it sees
political advantage in doing so. 177 The end result will inevitably be a
stronger central Commonwealth government. From the perspective
of those political forces opposed to 'neo liberalism' and 'market
fundamentalism', this may be no bad thing.
- 119 -Volume 11 - 2007
173 See COllstitution s 109. Re the High Court's jurisprudence on inconsistency between
Commonwealth and State Jaws, including the 'covering the field' test of indirect
inconsistency, see generally, Hanks et ai, above n 27, 510-60.
J74 Perhaps by using the external affairs power in addition to the corporations power: see,
eg, Stewart & Williams, above n 5, 159 re the use oflnternational Labour Organisation
(LLO) standards by an ALP government to create national laws on matters such as
collective bargaining. As discussed by Professor Stewart, the external affairs power is
the power that comes closest 10 the ideal of uniform regulation: see Stewart, above n 5,
5-6. For a critical discussion of the Work Choices ACT from the perspective of
Australia's international obligations, see Colin Fenwick and Ingrid Landau, 'Work
Choices in InternationaJ Perspective' (2006) 19 Australian Journal o/Labour Law 127.
The process of passing Commonwealth laws which would override inconsistent State
laws would be facilitated by the unanimous High COUlt holding in Botany Municipal
CouliCi! v Federal Airports Corporation (1992) 175 CLR 453 that inconsistency can be
'manufactured' by express words in a federal statute: see, eg, s 4 [re definition of
'State industrial authority' and 'State or Territory industrial law '1 s J6 of the Amended
Act. For a discussion of the 'manufacturing' of inconsistency, see Williams, above n
39,508-9.
175 Some commentators have speculated that the Work Choices Case may provide an
impetus for further referrals of power from the States to the Commonwealth;
furthermore, they have advocated in favour of such a 'referral approach': see Stewart
& Williams, above n 5. 160 (The referral approach has the advantage of security and
simplicity. 11 would provide an assailable constitutional foundation for a one stop
national law on employment. It also provides maximum flexibility as to the form of the
new law, and thus rea! advantages in its design. Normally the first order of business is:
which constitutional powers can we rely on and, given their constraints, which of the
policies we want to achieve are still possible? Under a refen-al the question is simply:
what SOlt of law do we want?').
176 New SOllth Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR 1, 147 [5431 (Kirby J).
177 Craven, above n 23,214; see also New Somh Wales I' Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR
I, 146 [5431 (Kirby J); StewaJt & WiIlial11s, above 11 5, 17! -3.
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The dynamic of federalism, with its division of powers amongst
separate and delimited governments, each confined to their
prescribed spheres of responsibility, does not work in favour of
strong government per se,J78 Capital by its nature is generally more
mobile than labour: 179 in a domestic imitation of globalisation,
competing systems of-regulation within the one national economic
free trade zone can lead to flights of capital from one 'overregulated'
jurisdiction to a nearby 'deregulated' jurisdiction,I80 As expressed
by Fudge, with reference to labour market regulation, 'mobile
capital will select jurisdictions that minimise the costs associated
with labour law and that embrace a market model of labour law as
sites for investment and production' ,181 Overreaching State
governments have outbid each other in their attempts to be even
more low taxing than their neighbours, leading, in part, to the
various State governments' unholy reliance on revenues from
178 New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR J, ISO [555J (Kirby J), 224 [775]
(Callinan J) and note esp fn 955. Untillhe late 1960s the Australian Labor Party was
pledged to the abolition of federalism and its replacement by a unitary system of
government: see, Brian Galligan, 'Federalism's ideological dimension and the
Australian Labor Party' (1981) 53(2) The AUSTralian Quarrerly 128, 133; E G
Whitlam, 'The Constitution versus Labor' in E G Whit1am, On AUSlralia's
COllsTifilTio/1 (1977) 15-45. By contrast, the Liberal Party has had since its inception at
least a token commitment to federalism. 'Ibe party's first federal platfonn in 1946
pledged the party 'to preserve the Federal system': see Graemc Starr, The Liberal
Parry ofAustraliall A Documelllary History (1980) 101.
179 A point not lost on the radical opponents of Federlltion at the turn of the 19'· century:
sec 'Gavah'. 'Federation and FactOlies', Tocsin (Melbourne), 2 December 1897 in
Hugh Andcrson (cd) Tocsin: Radical Arguments Against Federation J897-1900 (1977)
5.
180 Of course, Ihis dyslopic (from a left wing perspective) model of federalism at work
may be recasl (from a "eo liberal right wing perspeclive) lIS a business friendly ulopia.
Hence, the economic dynamics of a federal system are one of the reasons federalism
has its, albeit isolated., cheerleaders on the righl: sec, eg, John Roskam, 'Fedel1llisrn is
a safer way', Australian Financial Rel'iew (Sydney). 17 November 2006; Wo1fgang
Kasper, 'Making Federalism Floulish' in Upholding the Australiall ConSTitution (1993)
167; cOlltra Business Council of Australia, Reshaping AUSTralia's Federation (2006)
<http://www.bca.com.au/Contenta.px?CQnleDIID=IOO802> at 31 January 2007. See
also New SOla/J Wales \! Commonweallll (2006) 231 ALR I, 118 {446] (Kirby J). For a
discussion of the so called 'regulatol)' race 10 the bottom hYPOlhe5is', see Fudge, above
n 121.12\.
181 Fudge, above n 121.121
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gambling182 and handouts from the Commonwealth,183 and a
chronic long term underinvestment in vital public infrastructure. 184
A strong centralised govemment, which can apply unifolm taxes
across the national economy and impose uniform national
regulation, does not suffer, at least domestically, from these
structural deficiencies. 185
VII POSTSCRIPT - BLAINEY'S SEESAW AND THE RETURN OF
SOCIALISM?
Blainey is fond of using the metaphor of the seesaw in describing
the tilt and sway of counterbalancing political and social moods in
the course of global history since the mid 18th century.186 He has
drawn on this metaphor in predicting the possible resurrection of
socialism as an influential political ideology, in opposition to the
current dominance of free market liberalism and economic
rationalism. J87 Whether or not his predictions concerning the
182 For example, in 2005-06 the Victorian Government derived $1497 million from
gambling taxes. out of total taxation revenue of $J 0770 million (ie approximately 14
per cent of total taxation revenue); see Victoria, Statement of Finances 2006-07,
Budget Paper No 4 (2006) 134.
183 For example, in 2006-07 the State Government of Victoria estimates that 46 per cent of
its revenue in 2006-07 will derive from Commonwealth Grants; see Victoria, Victorian
Budget Overview 2006-07 (2006) 9.
184 As is reported almost weekly in the country's various state based broadsheet
newspapers: see, eg, 'Schools "worst in the country" principals say', The Age
(Melboume), 6 July 2006 (re the state of Victorian public school infrastructure);
Stephen Moynihan, 'Collapse Feared in Great Train Strain', The Age (Melbourne),
4November 2006 (re the state of the Victorian metropolitan railway infrashLlcture);
the stale of the nation's water resources and infrastructure (a traditional responsibility
of the States), in particular in the Murray-Darling Basin which traverses the states of
Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia, is now a matter of public
notoriety. .
J85 A point recognised by the pro business (and anti federalist) Business Council of
Australia: see Access Economics, 'The Cosl~ of Federalism' (Appendix 2 to Reshaping
AUSTralia's FederaTion, Business Council of Australia, 2006) 6, l4, 16,20.
J86 See generally. Geoffrey Blainey, The Great Seesaw () 988).
J87 See P Sheehan. 'Socialism will rise: Blainey', The Age (Melbourne), 9 August 1998,6;
see generally, Blainey, above n 186, 305-9. With reference to Blainey's
prognostications. at least one commentator, P P McGuinness, greeted the High Court's
decision in the Work Choices Case ~~ the striking of 'a blow for socialism'(!); see PP
,.
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influence of socialism turn out to be correct in Australia,188 there
will almost certainly be significant calls in the first half of the 21 st
century for increased government regulation in relation to what is
perceived to be 'anti social' corporate activity,189 as well as to
address the 'social dimension of globalisation',190 including
inequalities in the distribution of income, and to regulate corpo-
rations on environmental grounds. 191 As observed by Standing,
'every period of economic reconstruction, associated with major
technological change and the renewed pursuit of flexibility, has
eventually induced a counter-movement to provide new systems of
social protection compatible with new structures and processes' .192
In Australia, these calls will not likely be made under the banner of
socialism, but by reference to more contemporary political
movements such as environmentalism, or anti globalisation. And
there's the rub in Work Choices for the right its prosecution of
industrial relations 'reforni' has lead, by virtue of the litigation of
the Work Choices Case, to the augmentation of the Common-
McGuiness, 'Judges strike a blow for socialism', The Australian (Sydney),
15 November 2006, 16.
188 For example, within days of assuming the leadership of the Australian Labor Palty,
Kevin Rudd expressly disavowed any asSOciation with socialism: 'I am not a socialist,
I have never been -a socialist and I never will be a socialist': Michelle Grattan, 'Rudd
rejects socialism in vision for new Labor', The Age (Melbourne), 14 December 2006,
I. See also above n 103. Of course, while Blainey's prognostications may not bear out
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